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A PHENOMENOLOGY FOR CHRISTIAN ETHICS 
Richard C. Prust 
This paper argues that by describing phenomenologically what is distinctive 
about the significance of human acts as opposed to human events we provide a 
basis for distinguishing absolute from relative value. These distinctions will be 
used to articulate what Christians claim about divine Activity and then to 
describe-on the basis of the relationship between human and divine acts-what 
it means to call an act moral or immoral. What I hope will emerge will be useful 
as a description of faithful reasoning in moral matters. 
In short, we'll begin by describing how all of us know what we're doing and 
end up by saying how some of us decide what to do. 
I. Three Structures of Significance 
What is distinctive about signifying x an act, y an event and z a thing? What 
is distinctive about what we mean by "x," "y," and "z" by virtue of our regard 
for them as, respectively, an act, an event, and a thing? Asking this is a different 
matter from asking how we decide whether our regard (in a given instance) is 
for an act, an event, or a thing. We will assume that our regard is committed 
already. Our concern will be for the generic differences in how we comprehend 
the significances of x, y, and z given that we have already fixed our regard for 
them as, respectively, act, event, and thing. 
Here we are assuming, safely I believe, that in a broad range of common 
matters we agree conventionally in our designations. I picked up the morning 
newspaper: that was an act. I noticed your picture in the sports section: that was 
an event. I bolted upright at the squeal of tires in the driveway: an event too. I 
looked to see if there had been an accident: that was my act. The sports section 
and the tires were, of course, things. 
It is possible, of course, to get some disagreements on such judgments, espe-
cially from people with theories, but for our purposes that's not terribly important: 
what we're interested in is what rides on the judgment. We are interested in 
what we are saying about the significance of x in calling it an act. And of y, an 
event. And of z, a thing. 
An ordinary language observation will be helpful in getting us started. Whether 
we are talking about knowing an act, an event, or a thing, the word "comprehen-
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sion" is appropriate. I comprehend an act, an event, or a thing in intending its 
significance. Intending that significance is my comprehension of x, y, or z. 
Now what makes this suggestive is the way the etymology rings through in 
each instance of "comprehension." The significances of x, y, and z each constitute 
a "holding together" of certain elements. That is to say, it makes sense to see 
a structure for the significances of x, y, and z which in each case is a holding 
together of a group of subsidiaries as having a significance. 
Think of any act, such as one of those a police detective, a biographer, or a 
clinical psychologist might try to comprehend. The significance can be said to 
be a joint significance for a set of subsidiaries. Take for instance my act of 
writing this. There are muscular moves of my fingers, the knitting of brow 
muscles in concentration, various verbal moves and removes. Jointly they mean 
"my writing this," the act in which they are subsidiary elements. When you 
come to see the various subsidiaries as jointly signifying "my writing this" then 
you comprehend my act "of writing this." 
Let us call these subsidiary elements of an act the act's projects, and let us 
pause just long enough to notice two essential characteristics of the structure of 
the significance of such a comprehension. First, when we can be said to com-
prehend an act, the significance of each of the projects of that act is transparent 
to the significance of the act itself. If you see me move my fingers and fail to 
comprehend that I am writing this, you have failed fully to comprehend my 
moving my fingers. The meaning of the projects of an act is in tenns of the act; 
the act is the comprehensive meaning of its projects. 
Second, because the projects bear on the same significance, i.e., intend for 
their meaning the same significance, they enjoy among themselves a degree of 
integrity of bearing. By this 1 mean they are executed in a mutually facilitative 
way, one project never contending against the accomplishment of another. My 
verbal moves and my finger moves work together, facilitating each other in 
mutually accomplishing my act. To the extent we count my act successful we 
remark grace in the execution of its projects. 
I comprehend an act, then, as the integral execution of a set of projects each 
of which intends the meaning of the act, which is the significance I comprehend. 
We move on now to look at the significance of an event. Here, by an event's 
significance, I mean what we commonly articulate in answer to the question 
"what happened?," or "what is happening?," or "what will happen?": the sort 
of answers attempted by chroniclers, chemists, and weather forecasters. And 
here too we can regard the significances as comprehending subsidiaries, sub-
sidiaries we articulate when we are asked to describe "what happened." 
"The bam caught on fire!" 
What happened? 
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"The cow kicked over the lantern, and there was dry straw ankle deep 
on the floor." 
Here we unpack the meaning of "what happened" by referring to various 
explanatory elements or causal conditionals which have contingently come 
together as an event. The cow kicked, the lantern was in her path, and there 
was straw on the floor. What we comprehend as that event, y, the bam catching 
on fire, we comprehend as the coming together of these factors. They come 
together as the explanation of what happened, the signification of the event, the 
saying of what happened. We claim to comprehend an event when we hold these 
factors together as significant in saying what happened. 
Finally: things, as comprehended by topographers, musiologists and antique 
dealers, can be seen to be comprehensions of subsidiaries. In the case of things, 
the subsidiaries are the myriad phenomena which are significant to us as that 
thing. What are held together is a collection of appearances each of which I 
deem an appearance of that thing. The meaning of the thing is the jointly held 
meaning of all its appearances (along, of course, with expectations of future 
appearances and the conviction that others comprehend similarly). 
To recapitulate then: in comprehending the significance of x as an act we 
appreciate the integrated bearing of projects on their joint accomplishment. In 
comprehending the significance of y as an event we appreciate the contingent 
bearing of certain causal factors. And in comprehending z as a thing, we appreciate 
the joint meaning of an indefinite series of appearances. In these distinctive 
senses then the significances "x," "y," and "z" are holdings together of series 
of elements, appreciations of which constitute my various comprehensions. 
Our point in representing each of these three "comprehensions" as properly 
so called is to provide a basis for seeing what is distinctive about comprehending 
the significances of acts, of events, and of things. So we move now to draw 
those distinctions. I propose we do so with reference to what might be called 
the "focus" and the "resolution" for each type of significance. By "focus," I 
mean the level in the structure of significance (i.e., either the level of the 
subsidiary meanings or the level of the meaning of the comprehension of those 
subsidiaries) on which the meaning of the act, the thing, or the event gets 
articulated. And by "resolution" of significance I mean the completion of a 
definition fully adequate to the comprehending it facilitates. We can make these 
two notions clear by spelling them out in each of our three types of comprehension. 
Take things first. As we noted earlier, to comprehend something is to find 
certain subsidiaries transparent in their significance to the significance of their 
comprehension. I regard that as my clock over there on the table. I do not regard 
it as the appearance of my clock. No matter from which angle I look at its dial, 
I am looking at a round dial. So the focus of significance here is on the level 
A PHENOMENOLOGY FOR CHRISTIAN ETHICS 69 
of the comprehension of the subsidiaries, not on the level of the subsidiaries 
themselves. 
We can say too that that significance is resolute. It comprehends all of its 
subsidiaries. In my intending "my clock" from its every appearance, those appear-
ances find complete and definite meaning precisely to the extent I can be said 
to comprehend the clock. If any appearance failed to be transparent to its com-
prehension, that appearance would call into question that comprehension. 
We need to go on to analyze the significances of acts and of events as to their 
focus and resolution. But before we do, let me at least hint at the bearing this 
way of discussing significance has on moral reasoning. We are in a position to 
do that now, for the notion of resolute significance is, I want to argue, crucial 
to an understanding of moral significance. If an act has moral significance, its 
significance is resolute. 
Think of it this way. Moral significance, if there is such, is significance that 
one's acts have. Moreover, it is inconceivable that your moral acts are essentially 
incompatible among themselves, that doing one necessarily undid another. If 
one act counteracted another act, they could not be comprehended as "moral," 
for if the various acts we call "moral" were incompatible, both act and counterac-
tion could be called moral; and that would be inconceivable, for "moral" would 
then have lost its power to distinguish from what is contrary to moral acts. 
Therefore the moral significance of an act must be resolute significance. It 
must be signification from which all of my acts derive moral significance. Only 
under this condition can an absence of counteraction be guaranteed. I There are 
some important implications to be drawn from this point, and we can do this in 
the course of remarking on the focus and resolution of the significances of events 
and things. 
The significance of an event is distinct from that of a thing on both counts, 
on where it comes to focus and on whether it finds resolution. Think of how we 
focus on what happened: we do so with reference to the subsidiaries of our 
comprehension of what happened, namely whatever we comprehend as the con-
ditional and causal factors explanatory of what happened. When I say what 
happened I offer a set of significances, those of the individual factors, none of 
which can be said to be transparent for their significances on the comprehension, 
but each of which in its own right is brought into focus as an element in the 
comprehension of the event. 
If our focus, when we comprehend an event, is on the subsidiary level, that 
makes it impossible that the focus could be a resolute one, at least in the sense 
required for moral significance. The foci of the significance of an event have 
among themselves only a contingent relationship--the relationship they share 
by virtue of having eventuated the way they did. The various causes and conditions 
do not share a joint meaning which is essential to their individual meanings. 
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This means that the list of these causal conditional factors is an indeterminate 
one-a fact we acknowledge when we refuse to regard any historical account 
as finally definitive. We cannot claim to comprehend a complete, resolute 
meaning for what happened, for there are always causes beyond our ken. Since 
the meaning of the event, articulated in terms of its causal antecedents, is an 
indefinite collection of contingencies, that meaning has no essential resolution 
such that it could be said to comprehend its subsidiaries resolutely. 
Finally, we need to look at the focus and resolution of the significance of 
acts. This topic is particularly important for our purposes, for it is in discussions 
of the significance of various acts that moral discourse makes its moves! 
How do we focus on the significance of an act? 
Suppose I see you climbing a flag pole. What is he doing, I ask a mutual 
friend who happens to be standing by. Suppose our friend merely recites the 
various projects of the act in progress, your various muscular feats for the most 
part. Obviously this would be inadequate as a signification of what you are 
doing. But-and this is crucial-neither would it be adequate to answer in terms 
of the comprehension of those muscular moves: "He's climbing the flag pole." 
The significance of those words too is incomplete; it does not say fully what 
you are doing. Knowing you, I know that you don't just climb flag poles unless 
that act has some further significance, like replacing the pulley cord, or trying 
to spy over the garden wall, or escaping the teeth of a rabid dog. 
Suppose our friend answers helpfully: "He's replacing the pulley cord." Ah! 
Here I begin to comprehend what you are doing. And notice in what terms! The 
significance of your act is now being explained in terms of another comprehensive 
significance, one which comprehends your "flag pole climbing" as its subsidiary! 
And it is this structure, I want to contend, which is essentially that of the 
significance of every act. An act is intentional: it intends for its significance 
some more comprehensive significance which in tum can be said to comprehend 
it as a subsidiary. If we are to be said to comprehend an act, we comprehend 
some yet more comprehensive act (or thing, or event: we have not foreclosed 
those possibilities as inconceivable) which the act in question serves as a project. 
What you are doing intends the more comprehensive act of reroping the pulley, 
and we mean "intend" here both in the common sense of the intention of an act 
and the phenomenological sense of being significant in terms of. Your act intends 
in the latter sense by having as its significance the significance of the more 
comprehensive act. You are climbing the pole to fix the pulley. In other words, 
I comprehend what you are doing as "fixing the rope pulley." 
Our claim then is that we signify what we are doing with reference to some 
comprehension in which what we are doing functions as a project. When my 
act of moving my fingers took on significance as writing this, it was comprehended 
as a project in a more comprehensive act. And it is on the level of the more 
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comprehensive act that the significance of what I am doing finds its focus. 2 
These distinctions among what 1 have called the structures of significance by 
which we comprehend acts, events, and things are useful enough in a variety of 
ways. Recognizing them can lead us to correct the fallacies of reasoning which 
ignores them. For example, we can criticize reductionistic behavioral sciences 
for treating human acts as though they were events whose significance could be 
exhausted in terms of causal antecedents. Or we can brand a view superstitious 
for treating events as though they had intentional significance, as though they 
were acts. 
But for our purposes in developing a phenomenology for Christian ethics, the 
crucial question we must pursue has to do with the resolution of the significance 
of an act. Could an act have a resolute significance? The problem is posed by 
our disclosure of how we focus the significance of an act. The significance of 
an act, understood in terms of what comprehends the act as its subsidiary, is 
still not resolved completely if what comprehends the act is a yet more comprehen-
sive act, for then that act's significance would in tum have to be intentionally 
resolved. This suggests we could only disclose the significance of an act by 
continuing to press for the intentional significance of its successively more 
comprehensive intentional acts: What is your intention in fixing the pulley, etc? 
Or suppose for example I am trying to comprehend my act of writing this 
essay. I ask myself, what is my intention in writing this? Perhaps I would answer 
by summarizing my first paragraph: to describe the way one faithfully signifies 
acts as moral or immoral. What is my intention in this description? To remove 
an intellectual stumbling block to faith. And my point in doing that? To match 
my philosophical interests to my sense of vocation. 
My questioning takes me higher and higher among the intentional hierarchies 
by which I integrate my acts, i.e., by which I signify my acts as mutually 
bearing, as, if you will, "co-projective" of some very comprehensive act which 
comprehends them. Such a search could only end if there were an act which 
comprehended all that I did. 
Think of how we signify our intentional hierarchies, how we articulate them. 
Since they must (by definition) present themselves as the joint significance of 
an array of intentional activity, it seems appropriate to look for that joint signifi-
cance in the telling of the acts serially. In other words, we comprehend our acts 
in narratives, narratives about what we do or did. We unfold whatever self 
comprehension we enjoy in tales of how we act or acted. Sometimes these are 
little episodes we use to support a generalized narrative like "I am a good father." 
Even when we discuss these as though they were facets of some thing (my 
identity, my mind, my soul),3 we unfold them in terms of narratives: "I cuddle 
and feed her; I sing her to sleep sometimes; 1 wash the diapers." 
It may seem odd to speak of a narrative we tell as an act, in the singular. But 
72 Richard C. Prust 
it is useful to do so, for it enables us to see that these narratives too are fully 
understood only as episodes in a greater narrative, one which knits together what 
I am variously doing. If I think about why I am a good father I might reflect 
on the bearing which being a good father has in the more comprehensive act of 
being a good family man, for my role toward my little daughter is integral in 
my marriage. 
We can call to mind any number of self-defining comprehensions in terms of 
which what we do has coherence-in our families, on our jobs, in this or that 
relationship, even through our consumption habits. And it is by these comprehen-
sions that we understand what we are doing at any particular time. Thus it is by 
these comprehensions that we bring the various projects of a given act into 
graceful enactment, that is, into a bearing of execution wherein each is 
accomplished harmoniously with the others, and the whole is accomplished 
expeditiously. 
But these ways we have of giving joint significance to the various things we 
do: how might they come to have resolved significance? When we discussed the 
resolution of the significance of things, we counted the significance of "my 
clock" to be resolute in that it fully comprehended all the appearances I signify 
as "my clock." Comparably, if my acts were to come to have resolved significance 
it could only be in terms of some significance which could fully comprehend 
all of my acts! Is such a significance available to me? 
This is, indeed, the crucial question, for if you or I have a complete resolute 
meaning one by which we can be said to be comprehensible to ourselves and if 
the multitude of acts we do are what are comprehended by that significance, 
then that significance functions as the focus of meaning for all we do. If there 
is such a resolution for the significance of my every act, then and only then is 
there a measure for all that I do (namely how well its execution subsidizes or 
projects that comprehensive significance). In short, then and only then do I have 
a non-relative ethic, a focus for the significance of all that I do, a single meaning 
in terms of which all that I do takes on value in accomplishing.4 
To ask whether there is a basis for moral good then, we have to ask whether 
human beings have (or being human has) resolute significance. Our discussion 
so far has opened three possibilities: that a human has the significance of an 
event, of an act, or of a thing. For reasons that will become clear later, we will 
put off the third alternative until section III of this paper. For now let us ask 
whether it is conceivable that a human being could have a significance such as 
would provide for the moral evaluation of all that he did if his significance were 
that of an event (or series of events) or if his significance were that of an act. 
Let us begin with the forn1er alternative. Can what is named by each of our 
proper names have the significance of an event, or a series of events? 
To conceive of this calls for us to picture all of our acts as ultimately intending 
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events. That is to say, anytime we follow the hierarchy of intentional significance 
of one of our acts, we eventually signify an event. 
I ask you why you are boiling water. To cook an egg, you reply. Why cook 
an egg? to prepare my lunch! Why prepare lunch? Because I'm hungry; I want 
to fill my stomach! 
But does "filling my stomach" have an intention? Normally, the only answer 
that could be made to this question is that you intend your stomach to be 
(pleasantly) full, or at least that your hunger pangs be quelled. But notice that 
we have slid over into the comprehension of an event (in this case, the coming 
to be full of your stomach): we have designated it in terms of a causal conditional 
(in this case, your intention to fill your stomach). 
It strikes me that measured by the structure of the significance it has for us, 
at least a great deal of what we do bears on events. That is to say, if we pursue 
the intentional significance of what we are doing we will come to a point-perhaps 
very early on, perhaps after tiers of intentional disclosures-when it is inapprop-
riate to name a comprehension which itself has an intention. The comprehension 
we name we signify as an event. 
Let us call such acts, acts whose intentional significance is ultimately the 
significance of an event, eventuated acts. And we can say that events which are 
occasioned by my acts (like the event of satisfying my hunger enacted in cooking 
and eating an egg) are actuated events. 
If a human being is to be conceived of as a series of events it must be the 
case that his every act eventuates, that is that every account of what he is doing 
ends with its most comprehensive significance that of an event. It strikes me 
that this is a perfectly coherent way to conceive of my nature. But if my signifi-
cance is to be resolute-resolute in the sense required if the significance is to 
function as the moral focus for all that I do----then a series of events will not do, 
for, as we saw earlier, even a single event could not provide the resolute signifi-
cance required as a condition for moral significance. So then even if it were 
possible to comprehend the whole series of events which define me as a single 
event, that event's significance could only be articulated in terms of the signifi-
cances of its subsidiary events which among themselves have only a contingent 
relationship. Their significances, therefore, could not be brought into single 
focus so as to be resolute. The comprehension of the Event (as with the com-
prehension of any event) would be merely a comprehension of contingency 
having no single essential significance. 5 
For this reason, if we conceive of a human being as an Event or series of 
events, there is no basis for conceiving of any non-relative values. There being 
no resolute comprehensive meaning for the series of events I identify with, each 
event provides a source of value only for such acts as eventuate it. The event 
has no meaning in terms of any other event. Being an Event would mean having 
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a series of values which have no coherent significance among themselves, no 
principle of integrity, and which are only contingently related. Whether the 
significance be resolved, as with Moses by a single God behind all Law, or as 
with John Stuart Mill by a single principle of happiness, or as with Immanuel 
Kant in the unity of reason, the significance, to be moral significance, must find 
an all-comprehensive meaning, one the likes of which an event's significance 
cannot provide. 
We have been looking into a class of acts which seem to have the intentional 
significance of an event, the so called "eventuating acts." We suggested that a 
good bit of what we do might be so classed. And we went on to argue that any 
such act cannot enjoy moral significance, since its irresolution precludes the 
significance of an eventuating act from bringing moral value into focus. 
The recognition of this pure relativity of value in a life of eventuation is, for 
reflective people, the occasion for anguish. If in articulating my intentions I 
begin to talk in terms of causal antecedents, then what I am doing has no bearing 
beyond the events it brings about, no source for significance beyond the fact of 
the event. This feeling of the truncation of the significance of what I'm doing, 
this sense that it can never finally be comprehended as having a point, but only 
having a cause: this is anguish. If my vitality is directed only toward events, 
then my pursuit of meaning is betrayed, for my intention of an event can never 
provide the closure of significance I pursued. The existentialists saw this betrayal 
disclosed as a sense of the absurd, for the practical reasoning of intentional 
pursuit gets cut off in the act of eventuating. The significance it reasoned toward 
is incoherent by virtue of being uncomprehended. Itself it comprehends only 
contingency. 
II. The Moral, The Good 
We suggested earlier that one's pursuit of the meaning of what one was doing 
led one to name more and more comprehensive acts, and in so doing to stretch 
toward the moral significance of what one was doing. And we defined my act 
a as comprehending my act b when b (along with other of my acts) functions 
as a project in a. Therefore a comprehends, holds in integrated bearing, more 
of my acts than does b. The farther up the levels of intentional meanings we 
pursue the resolution of the meaning of what we are doing, the broader is the 
range of our intentional life brought to bear in the significances we comprehend. 
"Making lunch" is the integrated bearing of more of what I do than is "boiling 
water." 
If, as we also suggested earlier, my act is moral only when it is transparent 
to some significance in terms of which all of my acts could be judged, then 
there must be a single significance for all that I am doing morally. Only such a 
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single focused significance could resolve my action and thereby define my moral 
bearing, for only by intending a single focus can my acts be drawn into integrity 
of bearing. Under this condition, all of my moral acts would come to project 
the same act, the act whose significance defines the integrity of my myriad acts, 
defines, in other words, my personhood. 
To picture such complete resolution of significance through a unity of inten-
tional bearing, it helps to reflect on how we typically signify the various hierar-
chies of our intentional lives. We do so, as we said earlier, in the narratives we 
relate, to ourselves and to others, about ourselves. What is narrative if not the 
joint significance of acts? But now, what is demanded for that joint significance 
to be a moral significance is that it must itself be an episode in a single, coherent 
narrative, one in which all my moral acts function as projects! All of my stories 
must be part of a single, coherent narrative with which I identify. 
The notion of a coherent narrative derives from what it means for any set of 
acts to function as projects of a single act. Among themselves the coherency 
they enjoy could at very least be described as a compatibility of execution: The 
accomplishing of one could not preclude the accomplishing of another. So too 
in coherent narrative, no episode enacted counteracts another episode. As we 
saw earlier, only such a compatibility of execution could guarantee that moral 
obligations do not countermand each other such that one could not but do wrong. 6 
But how, conceivably, could our intentional activity have such integral mean-
ing? What source could there conceivably be for my story's meaning? There is 
an answer to this question to be read out of our depiction of one's integral life 
story as a single life act. Since an act's significance has an intentional source, 
if we are to conceive of our unity of personhood as a single act, realized as the 
coherency of our narrative, this narrative must itself be comprehended in a yet 
more comprehensive narrative! 
This means the question of whether there is a source of resolute personal 
significance as a unified life act refers us on to the question of whether there is 
an unfolding story in which my life as a whole could be an episode such that 
by intending my significance as a project in this story, I can come into integrity 
as a person. If such a possibility were realized, not only would the various 
intentional hierarchies I identify with be drawn into integrity among themselves 
as projects of my life act, but I would enjoy as well integrity with the other 
persons whose lives bore coprojectively with me. The significance of this com-
prehensive story in which my life functioned as an episode would resolve me 
by being both the focus for my significance as a person (by being the principle 
of my integrity of bearing) and the source of my community with other persons 
(by being our shared bearing as persons). 
By now it is probably abundantly clear what my claim is: it is precisely this 
possibility which is what is claimed in Christianity. There is an Act. an ongoing 
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Act in history, the Act of God. This Act is signified and comprehended by a 
sacred narrative. Human beings through the courses of this story have become 
episodes and in the course of so doing have found both the basis for their personal 
integrity and the realization of a new basis for human community. Their personal 
significance, derived as it is from the story it intends, successfully sustains their 
intentional integrity as persons and their correlation as persons in community 
(the love that is sustained among them). These integrities, personal and com-
munal, authenticate the personal act which sustains them and, in tum, the story 
in the context of which that personal life takes on significance. Our significations 
as persons are really sanctifications as characters in the on-going story, a story 
which executes us personally and communally. 7 
Two claims which Christian ethicists insist are implicit in theological orthodoxy 
can be seen to be implicit in this phenomenology of acts as well: once we signify 
the good as enActment, i.e., acts which are episodes in the Act, it follows both 
that spirit, not law, is good's determination, and that we enact the good as 
members of an intentional community. Briefly considering these implications 
will go toward characterizing the ethical reasoning which follows from the Act 
theology we have read out of our phenomenology of an act's significance. 
It is Christian orthodoxy that what signifies an act as good is itself spirit not 
law . We can see that this doctrine is implicit in the significance of good as the 
integrity of intentional activity, for what we recognize as "spiritual" relates to 
the integrity of intentional activity. Spirit emerges as we see mutual bearing in 
someone's acts. When we see a great deal of integration among acts, we see 
the actor as great-spirited. Full spirituality is full personhood, the total integration 
of what one intends. In finding the resolved significance of what one does in 
what comprehends all persons, Christian theology points to a Person as the good, 
for it points to the full comprehension of all personal acts. 
By this account law has a derivative status. It has its role, of course. It functions 
to record patterns of obedience, both to remind us of the Act, as in Hebrew 
cultic law, and to anticipate the terms of obedience. But law's capacity to function 
this way rests on its being a record of a moral discernment which was not based 
on law but on spirit. This prior discernment was a personal one, a discernment 
of the terms of my project status in the Act. So even if a law perfectly recorded 
this personal discernment, and even though that personal discernment might well 
have been shared by the whole community of faith, the law could at best be 
seen perfectly to record the terms of obedience for a given community's enAct-
ment. But those need not also be the terms of my or my community's enActment. 
Executed in the present, such activity might be incoherent in the narrative of 
current holy history. Conceivably, it could even be incompatible with the terms 
of obedience to the Act. Thus it is that faithful moral reasoning can never cite 
the law as its final authority. 
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Second, since the Act defines me as a project in it, it defines me as a co-project, 
i.e., in correlation with other personal projects. The enActments by which I am 
sustained as a person are therefore communal enActments. We enAct commun-
ally. By contrast, in a non-intentional, open society we interrelate as individuals. 
We do.not necessarily define our interests with some intention we share, rather 
we seek to protect our mutual freedom to pursue intentions which very well may 
not be coprojective. 
In intentional communities (be they marriages and other personal intimacies, 
political movements, army units, or churches) at least some range of our activities 
enters into coprojection with the acts of others, and in that range of activity, in 
what we do together, we enjoy the integration of our acts among us. 
Now if the Act is to be significant as such by its focusing my complete 
intentional integrity as a person, meaning than none of my acts counter my 
bearing on the Act, then radical community becomes possible, for if you and I 
are integrated in the same story, we need suffer no alienation from one another. 
Our persons enjoy mutual integrity-like the hands and feet of the same some-
body. 
Thus persons intend the Act as the significance of the new community created 
among them. Since it is their significance as projects which orients their various 
integrities as persons, and since projects are multiple in the unity of what they 
enact, the reality of personhood is also the reality of communal unity, the 
Kingdom, Agape. 
The claim we have advanced in this section is that absolute good is intended 
as an enActment whose resolute meaning is what comprehends me and draws 
me into community. All values come to be polarized around the role in sacred 
history my acts can play, for it is only in terms of that bearing that there can be 
said to be a non-relative good. Good is the act which enActs: all other acts must 
be measured morally by that significance. 
III. The Immoral, The Evil 
Discerning an act moral for its bearing as a project in the Act leads us to deem 
an act immoral when we recognize it as somehow incompatible with the Act. I 
think it can be readily seen that the judgement that one act is incompatible with 
another is one we make almost constantly in the course of our practical reasoning. 
We see that certain acts preclude or undo or counterproduce the effects of certain 
other acts. Punching holes in the sauce pan or vandalizing the stove is incompatible 
with boiling the water for the egg, so if in some scenario the latter were enActive, 
the former would be evil acts. If we can talk about incompatibility among acts 
as counteraction we can say simply that immoral acts counterAct. 
This suggests that while the integrity of acts defined as good establishes them 
78 Richard C. Prust 
as spirit, evil acts do not necessarily have integrity among themselves. They are 
defined only negatively, as counterActs. This means that while we need to 
account for the good in terms of Person, the source of immorality demands no 
such accounting. While accounting for evil in terms of "the Devil" or "Satan" 
may be colorful pedagogy, it has no basis in our phenomenology of the signifi-
cance of immoral acts. 
But then if immoral acts do not bear on some integrated anti-Act, can they 
be said to have any bearing? We have, of course, excluded the possibility that 
they bear enActively, by definition. Might we alternatively, see them bearing 
on events? We can, to be sure. But recall what we saw in section 1, that in the 
absence of any focus on an Act, the picture of the complete series of acts I 
identify as my acts, each bearing on an event, is the occasion for anguish at the 
pure relativity of acts' goods. 
In anguish I recognize no unity of bearing for what I do. I recognize that there 
is only relative value, the value of eventuation. It is an important question to 
ask ourselves: dare we picture ourselves that way? Sartre argues, of course, that 
it is the only honest way of being human. But he also argues that it is only 
tenable with great difficulty. There is a great tendency to want to resolve one's 
significance, and with it the significance of what one does, by insisting that one 
is comprehensible as already having resolved significance, in short, as having 
the significance of a thing. For Sartre, faith in resolution of one's significance 
as a thing is "bad faith" because it is self-deceptive: it is patently implausible 
to regard one's significance as that of a thing (a being-in-itself). Nonetheless we 
are willing to deceive ourselves to deliver ourselves from anguish. 
We need not pass judgment on the argument that the self cannot be construed 
as a thing.8 We need not because from what has already been argued we can 
see that one's very attempt to comprehend oneself as a thing fits our definition 
of an evil act! In my attempt to define myself substantially as an identifiable 
entity, my action precludes the possibility of my taking on intentional significance 
for the comprehension I call myself. If I were to succeed in comprehending 
myself, I would have made it impossible to take on personal significance as a 
project in the Act. Thus the act of self-signifying, precluding as it does an act 
bearing on intentional significance for myself, is necessarily counterActive. 
Not only is our flight from anguish into self-signifying counterActive, it is 
such in a special way, one which gives it priority over other counterActions, 
and one which therefore justifies theological regard for it as "original sin." All 
my counterActivity can be seen as derivative from this "original" sin when we 
recall that in the flight from anguish I try to establish a meaning for myself so 
as to give intentional significance to all that I do. I seek to establish a comprehen-
sion the very sustenance of which becomes my morality. Only such could deliver 
me from anguish. But this in turn means that every act I now regard as moral, 
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i.e., my every act by which I enact my significance, becomes by definition an 
immoral act, for it is executed in a way precluding my transparency of significance 
to that of an enActment. By trying to comprehend myself as a thing, by trying 
to regard myself identical with myself in the way I regard any thing identical 
with itself in each of its manifestations, I try to take focus on a resolute and 
complete significance for myself, i.e., one comprehensible intentional reference. 
The resolved focus of my meaning is to be accomplished on the level of my 
individual significance. Thus I make myself opaque with meaning precisely when 
morality mandates I become transparent for my meaning. 
We can spot this quest for thinghood in various moves of popular practical 
reasoning. Two worth singling out are, first, the timely "identity seeking" so 
popular during the last decade, and second, more perennially, the popular insis-
tence that one "has a soul." If my analysis of these is correct their very popUlarity 
can be seen as a measure of the priority of the quest they represent; for if one 
fails, the cost is anguish in the face of the complete relativity of the value of 
what one does. 
But how can "having an identity" spare me anguish? It could if my significance, 
that of the "identity" I "have," could be articulated such that it could measure 
the appropriateness of what I do. This is not difficult to imagine. We need only 
follow Aristotle in insisting that the function of anything is part of its definition 
(its "formal cause"). Presumably having a significant identity involves "having 
a certain nature" in accordance with which my activity is natural (moral) or 
unnatural (immoral). My identity then could be the significant focus in which 
what I do takes on value, positively or negatively. 
But notice that if this argument were sound, we should have to conceive of 
the relationship between me and myriad acts as analogous to that between some-
thing I comprehend and the myriad phenomena which are signified in that com-
prehension's significance. In that case the question would become paramount: 
can a thing have acts as the subsidiaries of the comprehension its significance 
achieves. 
Now in some contexts our everyday discourse seems to assume that it can. 
We speak as though governments or families or colleges were things, yet we 
would, if asked, analyze them in terms of what certain people do. So ordinary 
language does not necessarily find the notion inconceivable in principle. 
But suppose now we qualify this "thing" as the identity one seeks in one's 
flight from anguish. What abut the conceivability of that? 
If we have depicted anguish realistically, the answer must be, No: if anguish 
arises in my recognition that all of my acts eventuate, and that among these 
events I actuate there can be no joint significance (because of the very nature 
of how we signify events), then it is inconceivable that someone in anguish 
could come to discover a significance for himself which could deliver him from 
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anguish (by gIVIng him a natural way to act, a natural morality). Such an 
individual could see only a contingent collection of events among which no joint 
meaning prevailed, at least none such as could give significance to other events 
not in that collection. But if there is no comprehension of a set of events to be 
discovered such as could found a natural ethic, then any creation of one ad hoc 
could hardly be expected to comprehend yet-to-transpire events! Yet this is what 
would be required to be the case if an artificial identity were to outfox anguish. 
So then, for all its popularity, the notion that I can see all of my acts as subsidiaries 
of an entity of resolved significance does not seem to be a coherent one, at least 
not in the context of alleviating anguish. 
The other popular notion-one which is popular, ironically enough in religious 
discourse, but one which also sometimes functions originally sinfully as a pur-
ported deliverance from anguish-is the notion that human persons are or have 
immortal souls. Of course the notion has had and to some extent continues to 
have legitimate uses in faithful discourse, uses where the metaphysical naivete 
is not pernicious. But I think it is clear that when it is used to try to forestall 
anguish by signifying the self as an entity, it is subject to the same criticisms 
we found applicable to the notion of an identity. The notion has a dark ambiguity 
about it, one which blinds us to its incoherency more than identity is able to. 
Anguish breaks through even the most confidently espoused identity in an occa-
sional dark night. But so obscure is the illusion of having a soul that when we 
try to resolve our significance in it we often get away in confidence we have 
succeeded. That is why from the standpoint of practical theology we need to be 
aware of the originally sinful ploy the belief in one's soul can come to be. 9 
Our phenomenology of human activity has shown us the connection between 
the quest for resolution in the meaning of what we do and the basis for a moral 
significance for what we do. Seeking such resolution by conceiving of oneself 
as an event or a series of events cannot deliver one from the anguish of a 
meaningless existence and a merely relative morality. If, on the other hand, I 
conceive of myself as an act, I am lead to ask the religious question: is there an 
Act which could be the resolute significance of my acts and define the value of 
what I do? Our contention is that Christianity can be stated as an affirmative 
answer to that question. Moreover, we have argued, in the light of this answer, 
the alternative of seeking resolute meaning by conceiving of oneself as an entity 
must be seen as a species of sinful activity. Human acts, in this view, come to 
have resolute and moral significance only as God's Act. As such they enjoy an 
integrity, a resoluteness, which makes them graceful and establishes them as 
morally definitive personhood. 
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NOTES 
1. In holding that the moral significance of an act must be resolute in the sense of providing a 
criterion of moral value for all that one does, we are not denying that some of one's acts may have 
amoral significance. An Act would be counted as amoral if its execution, while compatible with 
my moral act, did not itself appear to have moral meaning. We can think of the moral significance 
of an amoral act as a certification that the act does not counteract what is done morally. 
2. It might be tempting to make a parallel claim about events, insisting that an event is to be 
understood as a subsidiary of another event which comprehends it (as one of its causal factors). In 
other words, it might be tempting to say what it, in turn, eventuates. After all, in ordinary discourse 
we do talk about an event's significance in terms of just this sort of eventuation: "That barn fire 
was significant in that it started the Chicago fire!" 
Indeed, if I'm going to counsel not yielding to that temptation I'm going to have to argue 
successfully that it is wrong-headed to regard an event's consequences as essential to its significance. 
This can be done, I believe, by appealing to that essential criterion for y's being an event: that it 
happen, that it take place in the moment. An event is, essentially, in the moment. It is what it is 
in the eventful moment. 
The consequent of an event cannot be in the moment: the consequent's significance has determi-
nation undeterminable in the moment of that event, namely the other causal antecedents of the 
consequent event. So if the essential characteristic of the event is that it is in the moment, and the 
significance of the moment must (logically) exclude what is consequent to the moment, it must be, 
strictly speaking, incoherent to speak of the essential meaning of an event as comprehending its own 
consequences. 
But how is it that ordinary usage sees the significance of the barn fire as the Chicago fire it 
caused~ Does this not show that it becomes essential to the significance of that event, that fire, that 
it had such and such consequences, that it started afire a large section of Chicago? 
What delivers us from having to make sense of the notion of "becoming essential" is the 
recognition of the fact that whenever I signify an event by its consequences I am thereby com-
prehending the consequent act. That is to say, the context of my assigning consequent significance 
to an event is my recognition of that consequent as eventful, as "of moment," as worth comprehending. 
We can put this in perspective by thinking of the varieties of ways we talk about an event's 
consequent events. If we assume that such talk constitutes an act, i.e., that one has intention in 
talking, then it must be in terms of one's intentions that one selects for comprehension only some 
of what happens. What happens is significant to the extent that it impinges on what we are doing, 
to the extent that it forms the arena of eventualities in which we act. If we see the origin of our 
regard for the consequent significance of an event in the context of whatever personal activity called 
forth the marking of the events, then it becomes apparent that designating a consequent significance 
for an event is only a mode of comprehending that event as the causal antecedent of its consequent 
event, in short, a mode of comprehending the consequent event. That being so, we need not resort 
to regarding the consequent significance of an event as essential to the significance of that event, 
for in all cases the relevant event, the one impinging on my activity and thus worthy of my notice, 
is the consequent event. If I can construe every event to which I give consequent significance as 
the causal antecedent of an impinging event, then only one focus of comprehension need be regarded 
as essential to that comprehension, the significance of the moment of the event. 
Because the consequent significance of an event is best thought of as a contingent not an essential 
significance, the significance of an event should not be construed as transparent to its consequences 
in the wayan act's significance is transparent to its intention. The event is, essentially, the eventuation 
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of certain causal antecedents. If a clock ticks, or a storm knocks out the power, or you see a comet, 
or you get delayed by a parade, or you stub your toe, we sufficiently signify these events and thereby 
comprehend what happened when we name together the crucial conditional and causal factors that 
led to them. 
3. We will suggest an account of why we have this tendency when we discuss "original sin" in 
section III. 
4. The distinction I am using between relative and absolute goods follows the traditional one, I 
believe. If I am out driving to enjoy the scenery, taking the skyline drive is a "good" choice. If I'm 
in a hurry to get where I'm going, taking the interstate is a "good" choice. Here "good" is an 
evaluation made on the basis of the intended act: does the act evaluated promise to be a successful 
project in the intended act? The assumption is that the act's significance as "good" pertains only to 
that intention. If I were in a hurry, driving the skyline route would not be considered "good." "Good" 
here is relative good. 
Only if there were a single significance for my life such that with reference to that significance 
all of my acts could find integrated bearing, could we talk about absolute or moral values, for only 
in that case would "good" have a non-relative meaning. If and only if there were such a single 
significance for my life could my actions enjoy resolute significance. 
5. Think of how pathetic the "self-made man" in Sartre's Nausea appeared as he tried to focus 
centrally on the event of reading all the books in the municipal library. The event of that happening 
which he tried to actuate, diligently, everyday, still could not make sense of the rest of his life. 
6. When this sort of countermanding goes on in Greek drama, the point seems to be precisely that 
no ethic is absolute. 
7. What enables us to say that in this character my personal significance, i.e., the integral significance 
of my activity, is complete and resolute? Why don't we have to press on to questions about the 
intention of the Act? Indeed, what keeps us from an infinite regress which finds every act intentional 
in the source of its significance and forces us to climb an endless mountain of them? 
What spares me the climb is that the climb becomes pointless beyond the point at which my 
personal significance becomes resolute. This happens when every act I undertake comes to bear 
coherently as my role in the story. The story then is fully the source of my significance: all of my 
activity either enacts my role in it or at very least eventuates compatibly with it. 
8. Being and Nothingness tries to demonstrate the plausibility of construing human reality as 
Nothingness. 
9. For a more complete account of how the metaphysical notion of a soul can be avoided in 
theological discussions of destiny, see my "The 'Self' as 'Saved,' " The Personalist, July, 1978, 
pp. 278-287. 
